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7  2 
 
Does  publicness  still  make  sense  as  an  issue  for  further  research?  Classic  organizational 
sociology  (or  standard  theory)  has  provided  a  breakthrough  for  understanding  public 
administration  and  management,  but  has  not  fully  explored  the  agenda.  Publicness  is 
analytically characterized by the ownership of two production functions:  efficiency (outputs), 
effectiveness (societal outcomes). While similarities may exist between public and non-public 
entities on some aspects of their organizational models, the effectiveness function they are 
accountable  for  is  quite  specific.  Such  a  perspective  allows  public  administration  and 
organizational scholars to explore new perspectives such as organizing and organized  (or the 
agenda of extended theory).   
 





Is it still worth to study the public sector and public administration with modern 
organizational theory and analysis lenses? The real world keeps struggling with 
issues and demands that require the intervention of some sort of public action no 
market  mechanism  or  charity  initiative  would  be  able  to  achieve.  And  yet 
knowledge production about organization, organized and organizing seems to 
have become rather dull whenever publicness is considered as a specific inquiry 
domain.  
Perspectives such as agency theory and neo-institutionalism, just to name a few, 
influence  quite  strongly  public  administration  studies.  By  comparison 
organizational sociology inspired research has lost part of the importance it had 
for the discipline in the late 1960s and the 1970s.   
Even mainstream organization studies as a field are not inspired or driven by 
public  organizationsz  as  much  as  they  are  by  other  objects  such  as  private 
management or economic regimes such as firms and markets. Publications and 







































7  3 
illustrations to explore broader facets of general organization theory. They may 
also fuel knowledge and approaches covering rather specialized areas or narrow 
defined domains such as those dealing with health, education, police or social 
welfare.  
Nowadays  the  proportion  of  papers  submitted  to  international  conference 
specialized in organization studies and that specifically dealt with public sector 
organizations and administration is rather low. For instance it has declined from 
42% to 7% when comparing four EGOS colloquia held in the 1980s to four held 
between  1999  and  2002  (source:  personal  archives).  Doctoral  theses  dealing 
with  public  setups  at  large  and  public  administration  in  particular  are  less 
numerous.  In  a  country  like  France,  in  which  organizational  sociology 
contributions had a major influence between the late 1960s and the 1980s, the 
total number of dissertations has declined by more than half since the 1990s 
while organization studies on firms and not for profit setups have at least tripled 
(sources: Ministry of Higher Education). Even professional journals in Europe 
as well as in the USA show a relevant decline of interest. Factors explaining 
such a lack of academic enthusiasm and creativity may be several.  
Value added return would be stagnating when not declining about knowledge on 
public organizations.  Their study would tend to replay old tunes such as the 
bureaucratic paradigm. 
Life  cycles  and  fads  should  also  be  blamed  for.  To  write  contributions  to 
supposedly dominant or fashionable schools of thought such as network theory, 
path dependency or critical studies would make access much easier to academic 
careers and journals.  
Professional  education  institutions  such  as  business  schools  offer  more  and 
better  job  opportunities  than  sociology,  public  administration  and  political 
science departments do. This coincides with a time when humanities are facing a 







































7  4 
Management  related  issues,  research  funding  has  also  massively  dropped  in 
many countries, at least when compared with other topics. 
Another line of argumentation refers to a lack of awareness junior researchers as 
well as some of their teachers manifest about fundamentals in social sciences. 
Scientific  lessons  and  work  published  before  the  1980s  are  simply  ignored, 
hindering  cumulative  progress.  Doctoral  students  when  not  their  teachers 
sometimes  evidence  quite  weak  or  biased  undergraduate  exposure  to  the 
fundamentals of disciplines like sociology and political science. 
The purpose of the paper is to argue that publicness still makes sense as an issue 
for further research. Its first section questions whether grounded organizational 
knowledge has really explored publicness in an exhaustive manner. For instance 
classic organizational sociology – defined by a standard theory or definition of 
its  domain  (Thoenig  1998)  -  has  provided  breakthroughs  as  a  Verstehen 
perspective, as a body of conceptual and methodological frameworks. At the 
same  time  it  did  not  fully  explore  and  address  the  agenda  about  public 
organizations as such.   
To consider publicness as an issue may benefit from a perspective suggesting 
that public organizations are organizations of a specific nature because, unlike 
firms,  churches  or  voluntary  associations,  they  are  in  charge  of  policy 
effectiveness, of a production function that generates societal impacts. While 
similarities may exist between public and non-public entities on some aspects of 
their  organizational  models,  the  effectiveness  production  function  public 
agencies and other governmental bodies are accountable for is quite specific 
from an action as well as from an order standpoint. This research agenda finds 
inspiration in policy studies and suggests a theory of governmental agencies of 
its  own  that  provides  a  fruitful  angle  or  framework  to  test  the  publicness 
dimension. To study policies simultaneously as processes and as contents offers 







































7  5 
Knowledge gaps remain that should be of interest for political scientists, public 
administration and other related social science disciplines. 
 
Rise and decline of organizational sociology. 
 
Publicness  defined  by  the  formal  status  of  the  organization  remains  a 
questionable and fuzzy criterion. A variety of legal statuses and territorial areas 
handle public affairs in modern societies. Governments at various levels, from 
urban  communes  to  the  United  Nations,  rely  on  complex  and  highly 
differentiated  sets  of  formal  organizations  they  control  (Thoenig  1997).  The 
separation  line  between  public  and  private  does  not  appear  easy  to  draw 
descriptively.  
The  reference  to  formal  status  provides  no  solid  ground  for  another  reason.  
Civil service in the Common law tradition as well as public administration in the 
Roman law perspective do not control in a monopolistic way the handling of 
public affairs, from law and order, fire protection and environmental protection 
policies to education, land use and social welfare. Hybrid institutional designs 
and fuzzy legal statuses are common practice. Some public agencies operate in a 
market related manner and even compete openly with private firms. The state 
acts  as  a  profit-oriented  owner.  In  several  sectors  such  as  social  welfare 
governmental  authorities  subcontract  collective  good  mandates  and  allocate 
public funds to not for profit associations, the latter getting most of their budget 
from  taxpayer  money,  not  from  charities  or  clients-users.  Some  non-
governmental entities such as firms, associations or citizens play an important 
role in delivering collective goods, quite often without being formally mandated 
to do so. The state is far from having exclusive ownership and control of public 
affairs, from the definition of the issues to be addressed to the design of actual 







































7  6 
To assume that reporting to some state or governmental authority provides a 
sufficient  property  of  their  uniqueness  may  lead  scholars  to  ignore  the 
contributions  made  by  sociology  of  organizations.  Within  half  a  century  the 
scientific  status  of  public  sector  in  organizations  studies  has  dramatically 
evolved.  
The 1960s settled a major debate. Old institutionalism inspired by formal-legal 
approaches such as public administration theory in North America and science 
administrative in Europe started to decline in an apparent irreversible manner. 
More  rigorous  observation  of  organizational  functioning  and  behaviors  have 
taken the lead. Notions like the state and the public administration have become 
analytically  poor  or  disappointing.  They  hide  differentiated  specific    local 
orders.  Action  boundaries  keep  fluctuating.  Publicness  should  not  to  be 
considered as a given or an axiom but as a problem for enquiry. 
Sociology of organizations also challenged Marxist inspired perspectives. Meso 
level phenomena such as organizations should not any longer be considered as 
mere  superstructures.  Class  struggles  and  vested  interest  dynamics  do  not 
explain  the  whole  story  about  how  ministries  and  public  agencies  operate. 
Organizations should be approached as specific orders and locally embedded 
action systems.   
The end of the 20
th century coincides with a spectacular change, as if sociology 
of  organizations  has  indeed  lost  momentum.  Other  theories  have  taken  the 
academic  lead.  Sociological  perspectives  have  been  marginalized  by  other 
disciplines or paradigms.  
An  illustration  is  provided  by  public  management  education.  Public 
management as a specific domain had developed in the USA in the early 1970s. 
It  ranked  organizational  issues  at  the  top  of  priorities  to  be  researched  and 
managed. Leading figures like Aaron Wildavsky (1979), a political scientist by 
training,  considered  contributions  made  by  organizational  theorists  such  as 







































7  7 
1980s, political and organizational Verstehen of public phenomena lost some 
ground. Competing disciplines came to the forefront that gave more visibility to 
normative perspectives. Policy analysis and policy design inspired by axiomatic 
approaches  that  blend  microeconomics,  agency  theory  and  quantitative-only 
types  of  data  took  over.  In  some  cases  they  forgot  analysis  underway  and 
preached managerial recipes linked to ideologies such as rational choice.  
Publicness  as  an  issue  was  taken  over  by  two  alternative  paradigms: 
perspectives inspired by market and firm references, new versions of old critical 
or even anti-positivist postures. While ideologically New Public Management 
and Postmodernism do not share much in common, both tend to question when 
not deny the specificity of public organizations as social constructs. The former 
argues that market principles and private firm type of management have to be 
used as benchmarks. The latter considers that the public sector is just one facet 
of  a  much  broader  trend  or  picture  that  is  at  work  across  societies  such  as 
undesirable  organized  principles  and  organizing  processes  oppressing 
contemporary mankind, enabling capitalism and globalization to rule the world. 
In some extreme versions, critical  theories even argue that organizations are 
phenomena or artifacts that are illusions, not topics for knowledge. 
Defined by Max Weber (1922) as a major step toward modernity and rationality 
in act, bureaucracy gradually became a scapegoat and a problem to fight. It is 
ironic to see that, more than sociologists, economists such as Kenneth Arrow 
(1974)  and  Oliver  Williamson  (1975),  to  name  a  few,  were  pioneering  in 
characterizing the properties of firms as a distinctive type of organization. Such 
contributions, the ways of reasoning and the pro-market flavor they promote, 
have influenced quite strongly public organization studies for the last part of the 
twentieth century. Rational Choice and Public Choice approaches define new 
frontiers about public sector enterprises. Efficiency is substituting legalism as 
source of legitimacy. Management, not administration, provides the reference 







































7  8 
legitimated by international institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD, 
inspired  many  if  not  most  public  funding  allocated  to  programs  on 
administrative reform in the public sector.  
 
What classic standard theory left unachieved 
 
Classic organizational sociology has in fact partly failed. Most of its leading 
figures have dealt with publicness related matters in an ambiguous manner.  In 
fact  all  the  promises  have  not  been  or  could  not  be  delivered.  Various 
endogenous reasons may explain the relative decline of classic organizational 
sociology applied to governmental agencies.  
One may be linked to the term of bureaucracy.  
The founding father himself did not help when he published in the 1920s his 
theory  of  bureaucracy  as  a  formal  organization.  On  one  side  it  inspired  an 
ambitious  and  fruitful  research  program  that  started  in  the  early  1950s  with 
contributions  from  pioneers  such  Robert  Merton  (1952),  Robert  Dahl  and 
Charles Lindblom (1953) and Peter Blau (1955). It lasted at least for twenty 
years.  
On the other side it opened the door to an ambiguous positioning of the term of 
bureaucracy.  Three  meanings  overlapped  and  still  do:  a  descriptive  and 
conceptual one that could apply to any organization, whatever its legal status 
would be, a way to name any agency controlled by the state, and a pejorative 
meaning linked to big government, red tape and frustrations of users. Despite 
attempts  to  avoid  confusion  made  by  authors  like  Victor  Thompson  (1961), 
despite analytical and conceptual frameworks defining the model and its latent 
functions by Robert Merton (1940) or Michel Crozier (1963), classic or standard 
sociology of organizations was to some extent trapped by the polysemic status 







































7  9 
The motivations that were driving the personal agenda of some scholars were 
identical  to  the  disappointment  and  the  worries  that  had  inspired  Roberto 
Michels  (1949)  about  the  becoming  of  socialist  parties  and  trade  unions  in 
European democracies in the early part of the 1900s. Trotzkyist activism during 
their  youth  influenced  political  critiques  of  New  Deal  institutions  by  Philip 
Selznick  (1949)  or  motivated  Martin  Lipset  and  his  colleagues  (1956)  to 
understand  why  it  was  possible  to  avoid  the  iron  law  of  oligarchy  and  to 
maintain a high level of democratic life to develop within a American trade 
union. From U.S. southern states libertarian such as Theodore Lowi to Eastern 
liberal backgrounds such as Graham Allison and Robert Dahl, the spectrum of 
sources of inspiration and social debate leading to organizational studies was 
quite wide. The economic crisis of the early 1930s followed by the management 
of the Second World War efforts and consequences had boosted the growth of 
government. Various models of Welfare State were starting to develop on both 
sides of the Atlantic Sea.  
To some extent sociology of organizations studying governmental organizations, 
but  also  political  parties  and  even  firms,  became  perceived  as  focused  too 
narrowly  on  field  studies  and  model  buildings  that  were  bureaucratic  and 
therefore  pathological.  Alternative  solutions  or  better  types  were  not 
spontaneously  associated  with  its  knowledge.  This  opened  the  way  to  other 
approaches or disciplines, considered as more in line with modernity. 
Another  reason  of  the  unachieved  delivery  by  standard  theory  is  linked  to 
postulates that have not been verified accurately.  
Such is typically the case with the existence of the differences, if any, between 
organization in the public sector and organization in other sectors. A striking 
aspect of the program classic sociology  of organizations has achieved is the 
relative incomplete or ambiguous answers it has provided to public organization 
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been published since the late 1950s (March and Simon 1958; March 1965) did 
not devote any specific chapter to the issue. This reflects a broader phenomenon. 
A  widely  shared  opinion  by  organizational  sociologists  was  that  differences 
existed. Private firms were assumed to be less rigid and more able to listen to 
their  environment.  The  reason  is  that  they  have  to  survive  in  competitive 
markets,  while  public  agencies  face  less  changing  and  unpredictable 
environments. Public agencies are postulated to be more efficient than private 
firms when economic and political development is required. Fred Riggs (1969), 
for instance, argued that developing countries need public sector to come to 
prominence  because  of  a  polity  “unbalanced”  between  their  strong  political 
system and their weak public administration sphere.  
Nevertheless  comparisons  are  not  always  based  on  technically  solid  ground. 
While some examples are quite disturbing, evidence shows in a consistent way 
that, for instance, the existence of a specific and strong form of administrative 
sector does not explain, all other things being equal, why development is or is 
not  generated.  Ordinal  differences  on  various  parameters  such  as  formal 
properties or modes of functioning of organizations were attributed to the fact 
that they are profit oriented, not for profit or governmental. The Aston studies 
underlined that size was a key cause (Pugh 1998). Other studies suggested that 
bureaucratization  measured  by  the  levels  of  formalization,  centralization  of 
authority and complexity in the division of tasks is in many cases quite strong in 
leading business firms and, comparatively, quite low in public agencies (Dupuy 
and Thoenig 1985). State bureaucracies are not by nature prone to rigidities in 
the way they actually function, other types of organizations being less stalled as 
a matter of principle. Today the agenda is quite open to further research. 
One point is striking about the interface between sociology of organizations and 
publicness. Knowledge produced by the discipline owes a lot to the study of 
public sector agencies. But publicness has not been its key concern as a social 
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In Europe and even more in the U.S.A., pioneering contributions by sociologists 
have studied public agencies, but as empirical tests for the validity of a broader 
paradigm. Herbert Simon (1947) observes how city park managers decide about 
new projects. The doctrine of absolute rationality is fallacious when considering 
human behaviors in organized settings. Philip Selznick (1949) studies how the 
Tennessee Valley Authority created by President Franklin Roosevelt is exposed 
to secondary institutionalization processes at the level of its grass roots units.  
This tradition made immense contributions to knowledge about organizations in 
general and firms in particular. Agencies operating in the public sector have 
provided  breakthrough  discoveries.  Concepts  such  as  cooptation,  power  and 
control, theories such as culturalism, functionalism and redundancy and overlap, 
have received wide attention. Studying two public welfare agencies Peter Blau 
(1955) discovered that employment security and autonomy are conducive to a 
positive attitude toward change. Michel Crozier (1963) derived his explanation 
of the way national cultural norms embedded organizations from monographs on 
the French postal agency and the state owned manufacture of cigarettes. James 
March and Michael Cohen (1974) developed the garbage can model primarily 
from  observations  about  how  American  universities  are  governed.  The  list 
seems endless of many of the prominent figures in the discipline from Amitai 
Etzioni (1961) and his discovery of the phenomenon of compliance to Charles 
Perrow and his social-structural approach (1970). 
Very few organizational scholars have tackled the publicness issue. Peter Blau 
and Richard Scott (1962), for instance, formulated a  typology differentiating 
commonweal  (or  public),  business,  service  and  mutual  benefit  organizations. 
Nevertheless most of the time, public organizations were treated as illustrations 
of a more general type of meso social configurations called organizations. Any 
organization, including the firm, is embedded by power dynamics and functions 
as  a  political  arena  made  of  strategic  behaviors  (March  1962).  Today 
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by business schools and applied to economic regimes and firm management. 
Conformity and legitimacy imperatives explain why similar institutional forms 
diffuse across organizational fields. The irony is that many pioneering studies of 
American sociological institutionalism (Thoenig 2003) had studied public sector 
related phenomena: the diffusion of new patterns of organizational management 
across cities (Tolbert and Zucker 1983), elementary schools (Scott and Meyer 
1994), etc. How far the public status makes or does not make a difference with 
firms or with not for profit statuses still remains an open research question. 
 
Taking advantage of policymaking studies   
Public administration as a discipline has taken over bureaucracy as an issue at a 
time when classic organizational sociologists left it.  Quite many perspectives 
have explored it under various angles (Meier and Hill 2005). The fact is that the 
organizational dimension  itself remains quite marginal. Other approaches are 
dominant. 
Compared  to  knowledge  generated  by  organizational  sociology,  New  Public 
Management, postmodern view and agency theory are perspectives based on 
poor models when not questionable premises. Neo-institutionalism deals with 
administrative  reforms  leading  to  non-learning  processes  in  public 
organizations,  as  if  organizations  would  not  be  autonomous  change  actors.  
Network  approaches  are  to  some  extent  an  exception.  As  approaches  they 
borrow quite much from recent breakthroughs made by organizational theory 
applied to business and to political sociology.   
What is also striking is that the linkage between bureaucracy and publicness has 
not been solidly established in organizational terms. 
The distinction between private and public, between profit, not for profit and 
governmental management, has been addressed since the emergence of public 
administration as an academic discipline. The 1970s and 1980s coincided with 
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Lynn 1981; Rainey 1989; Yates 1985). Suggesting that public management is 
harder than private management, Graham Allison (1980) lists similarities and 
differences.  On  top  of  ownership,  public  organizations  are  supposed  to  be 
different because of their exposure to the political arena or to their dependence 
to governmental funding  (Warmsley and  Zald 1973). Barry Bozeman (1987) 
defines  publicness  as  the  fact  that  government  more  than  market  factors 
influences action-taking and contexts in which organizations operate, whatever 
their legal status is.  
Strong evidence based on sharp organizational analysis is lacking as a literature 
review suggests it (Rainey and Chun 2005). Normative discourses still prevail 
such  as  ethics,  public  interest  in  Common  Law  countries,  intérêt  général  in 
Roman  Law  states,  or  accountability.  Despite  the  fact  that  New  Public 
Management and the early 2000s seem to consider the case as solved, the private 
being the ultimate reference, the opinion still prevails that publicness makes a 
difference, as emphasized by authors such as Jonathan Boston (1995). 
The  influence  of  institutionalism,  old  or  neo,  and  the  reference  to  political 
economy remain quite influential.  Not much inquiry has yet been provided to 
test the validity and plausibility of the assumptions. Lists and criteria remain 
rather descriptive or institutional. And not much effort has been made to build 
an  analytical  framework  that  would  really  cover  more  key  organizational 
characteristics and less management focused properties.  
A few authors have wisely suggested openings to explore the publicness agenda 
that organizational studies should take into account (Schubert 1960; Goodsell 
1990;  Ranson  and  Stewart  1989).  For  instance  public  interest  should  be 
considered  as  embracing  subjective  interests  as  well  objective  goods.  Public 
organizations deal with political agendas. The state is not an integrated system 
but is made of a plurality of more or less autonomous actors. Policy effects are a 
key action concern.  Policymaking matters from a process as well as  from a 
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ignored  for  years  –  the  distinction  between  the  formal  organization  and  its 
environment,  asymmetric  and  transitive  relationships  inside  monocentric 
hierarchies,  etc.  To  define  heuristic  approaches  becomes  a  challenge 
organizational studies should consider head on. 
In the  late 1970s and early 1980s several public administration scholars  left 
organizational sociology stricto sensu and joined political sociology or science, 
but  without  dropping  their  research  interest  for  governmental  agencies  and 
publicness as such, on the contrary. Pioneering studies in Europe (Mayntz 1979; 
Dupuy and Thoenig 1979) as well as in the USA (Pressman and Wildavsky 
1973; Bendor 1985; Chisholm 1989). Exciting dialogues between policy studies 
and organizational reasoning derived from the study of constitutive polices such 
as intergovernmental studies and decentralization of territorial affairs (Rhodes 
1982;  Thoenig  2006).  Studying  policies  is  a  stimulating  way  to  explore 
organizations with different lenses or from a different angle.  
A  fruitful  approach  of  publicness  to  consider  for  organizational  knowledge 
purposes assumes that public organizations are social systems driven by and 
accountable for two production functions, and not just for one, as it is the case 
for firms and voluntary associations (Thoenig 1985): 
•  operational  outputs.  This  function  relates  to  inner  efficiency,  to  the 
production of specific goods and services that can be easily identified and 
numbered; 
•  societal change outcomes. This production function handles the delivery 













































7  15 

















Administration in general refers to the way resources or inputs such as money, 
personnel and raw components are linked to visible outputs or finished products 
such  as  the  number  of  cars  manufactured  or  the  volume  of  oil  refined.  The 
purpose is either to minimize the resources used to achieve a certain amount of 
production or to maximize production for a given amount of resources allocated. 
Economists describe such a coupling as an internal production function. The 
goal to achieve by the hierarchy is efficiency. The tools available are techniques 
and procedures such as accounting, cost control, human relations, logistics, etc. 
The time horizon is conventionally defined and not a matter for debate. Budget 












Production function 1 (Efficiency) 
 
Internal administration. 
Productivity, cost, quality, reliability  
 
Production function 2 (Effectiveness) 
 
External policy management 
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The  nature  of  public  efficiency  remains  an  organizational  research  question. 
Productivity,  client  satisfaction,  costs  are  criteria  among  many  others  to 
consider. It also has been argued, well ahead of New Public Management, that 
efficiency as a normative reference remains too often success-oriented (Landau 
and  Chisholm  1995).  Other  doctrines  of  efficiency  are  at  work  in  public 
management  such  as  failure  avoidance.  In  this  case  reliability,  and  not 
optimality, provides their foundation. Organizational redundancies and overlaps 
of  jurisdictions  may  downgrade  microeconomic  performance  proxies  and 
increase the annual cost structure. But whenever a major accident, catastrophe or 
unrest happens, whether meteorological, technical or social, the system supplies 
enough slack and reliable sources of know-how to minimize the consequences. 
Except for some minor legal differences (status of the employees, appropriation 
and accounting rules), public agencies face similar administrative contexts than 
those private firms acting on the market are dealing with. Inner management 
looks alike in both worlds. But, and this makes the whole difference, public 
sector organization administration has a second production function to take into 
account,  that  private  organizations  have  not.  This  function  is  called 
effectiveness. It is not internal to the institution but external. It is embedded in a 
societal fabric of some sort. Therefore it is more complex to administer a public 
organization than a private one.  
Effectiveness refers to the way specific outputs or finished products, goods and 
services, are causally linked to policy outcomes and societal impacts they are 
supposed to generate. These outcomes and impacts are of a special nature as 
compared with outputs and products. No consensual timeframe states when to 
make  such  assessments,  how  and  with  which  indicators.    The  public 
organization has no monopoly to define them a priori. More or less volatile 
groupings express non convergent opinions about them, select those that make 
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societal impacts are a success or a failure, and whether they may be attributed to 
a specific policy endorsed by a specific public institution. 
To assess the level of publicness, it is less important to consider whether on not 
an organization is owned or controlled formally by the state, but it becomes 
more relevant to check whether it has discretion to define its own criteria of 
success and its ultimate goals. Inside the same country publicly owned agencies 
may differ quite much. Some function as if they would be private firms, setting 
their own goals and criteria of efficiency, without being accountable for any 
effectiveness  function.  Others  are  accountable  de  facto  for  both  production 
functions.  They  are  supposed  to  be  somehow  efficient  while  being  also 
effective. How organizationally the balance between both production functions 
is achieved, and with which consequences, are questions still to open to further 
research.  
 
An analytical framework 
As a concept publicness is characterized by four main properties: 
•  ownership of societal impacts 
•  policy mandates legitimized by governmental authority 
•  multiple and divergent indicators of success and failure 
•  no spontaneous self-evaluation. 
A public organization manages a policy which ultimate goals are defined and 
assessed  by  third  parties,  some  governmental  authority  when  not  a  set  of 
differentiated stakeholders, public and private.  
Public organizations do not legitimize by themselves only the goals or impacts 
of the policies they handle.  Third parties do, usually the political authorities that 
govern the domain and are legitimized to act. They allocate monies, appoint 
people, fund the acquisition of equipment, etc. Two classes of outcomes are 
expected to be induced.  Negatives are to eliminated or have not to happen that 
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pollution, etc. Positives should be supplied, outcomes should be  provided to 
induce improvements or to satisfy aspirations that otherwise, if nothing would 
be done by the government and the state, would not be supplied by civil society 
spontaneously  –  cultural  development  and  access  to  arts,  local  economic 
development, access to job markets, etc.  A public policy is not just the policy of 
a public organization. Polities shape and governmental policies legitimize a set 
of  collective  norms  and  actions  about  societal  change  to  which  public 
enterprises  are  expected  to  conform.  Exogenous  reasons  and  achievements 
frame effectiveness. They provide the essence of a public enterprise. 
Evidence shows that the power of political authorities may vary . They may not 
always seem to be proactive, but their non-acts are acts that matter and have 
consequences. Impacts to achieve are most of the time not defined in details and 
a  priori.  Political  rationality  or  electoral  cycles  may  lead  governmental 
authorities  to  avoid  commitments  about  long  term  and  quantitative  goals. 
Political executive and legislative bodies care more for symbolic impacts and 
immediate support from public opinion and less for actual consequences in the 
long run. Agencies may even be left by their own so that they substitute in a 
technocratic manner their own know-hows, routines and interpretations of the 
goals to reach. In certain circumstances more cynical motives may be at work. 
Governmental authorities pass new laws and make new policy announcements 
while being aware of the difficulty to get them enforced on the field. Such is the 
case for symbolic policies. Their real stake is to produce support from public 
opinion, and not lasting impacts on daily practices. Their latent message sounds 
like    “do  not  worry,  we  care”.  But,  at  the  end,  accountability  and  initiative 
remain attributes of the political arena.    
Public organizations play a societal role  that goes far beyond their technical 
function of providing goods and services. They shape society, polity and the 
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Reinforcing  their  legitimacy  to  act  and  impact  society  is  one  of  the  key 
uncertainties they face.  
A public agency may have to maintain certain categories of roads in a specific 
geographic area. To do so it can deliver itself all the outputs that are part of its 
mandate. It may also subcontract their production to private suppliers. In any 
case the raison d’être of its internal production function or efficiency is not to 
expand its road maintenance market share or to deliver a profit that maximizes 
the satisfaction of its owners or principals. What really matters at the end is that 
traffic safety does not downgrade, that transportation fluidity increases, that the 
politicians  who  head  the  public  jurisdiction  do  not  get  blamed  by  local 
constituencies.   
In any case such societal impacts are not obvious to define. Public organizations 
face a world in which ambiguity is the name of the game. How far the impacts 
or outcome are direct consequences of causes such as the outputs delivered by 
the  agency  remains  not  always  easy  to  assess.  On  top  of  that,  political 
rationality, which implies the possibility open to political policy makers not to 
be held responsible for their past decisions whatever their actual impacts have 
been, makes the environment of public organizations quite volatile and uncertain 
Embedding  public  agencies  socially  and  politically  is  a  way  to  induce 
effectiveness. To a certain extent backward mapping and re-interpretation of 
rules  are  quite  common  practice  at  the  level  of  so-called  street  bureaucrats 
(Elmore 1979). 
Publicness implies that agencies are confronted with two kinds of knowledge 
sources. 
One  is  related  to  the  structure  of  its  formal  organization.  Organizations  in 
general are social constructs aimed at achieving some collective reliability out of 
risky actors such as individuals and small groups. How to make different logics 
of actions compatible to produce a certain type of goods and services is perhaps 
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Key  properties  of  an  organization  such  as  centralization  of  authority, 
asymmetric  and  linear  relationships,  specialization  of  tasks  and  jurisdictions, 
procedural as well as substantive decision rules design a structure of knowledge, 
a theory (Thoenig 1998). They anticipate consequences to be generated. They 
prescribe what will happen when specific acts are produced, when such and such 
governmental interventions are made in a stated area and in certain manner. 
Knowledge is perfect when no fault occur, when the formal solutions for the 
operations to conduct are always correct. Organizations supply certainty and 
reliability.    
Another source of knowledge derives from the policies themselves. Policies also 
are  theories,  but  of  a  different  nature  than  organizations.  Any  policy  blends 
some normative with some factual premises. Death penalty is a judicial policy. 
Its raison d’être can be formulated according to two quite different premises. 
One  is  moral  or  ideological.  The  penalty  may  be  legitimized  as  a  form  of 
societal duty, of ethical revenge. Those who have killed have to pay for their 
crime with their own death. Such values are set or shared a priori. They are not 
testable  and  open  to  verification.  Another  set  of  premises  legitimizing  death 
penalty are factual. Such is the case with deterrence. Future events are expected 
to differ from past ones.  Potential killers shall be afraid to commit a crime of 
the same class. Consequences can be traced, tested empirically and evaluated 
later on.  
Factual premises are hypotheses (Landau 1977).  A policy proposes a set of acts 
and non-acts to alter some existing context or mode of conduct. It is intentional, 
as it expresses the will of a policy maker. It is designed to attain in the future 
some  goals  or  outcomes  by  producing  today  some  outputs.    Policies  are 
therefore  describing  or  postulating  in  a  more  or  less  implicit  manner  three 
components; a desired state condition, a supposed present condition, a set of 
means to change the present condition in the future. They assert if-then linkages. 
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that is uncertain and risky. The function of their empirical claims is to eliminate 
errors.  
Facts suggest that errors are common and that  dysfunctional phenomena are 
widely present.  
A first one is linked to errors of the theory on which the policy is relying. The 
latter may be built on wrong effectiveness assumptions about social, economic 
and  ecological  phenomena.  Wrong  assumptions  are  made  about  the  factual 
situation  today  and  the  probability  to  generate  the  future  desired  state.  For 
instance death penalty does not deter killers. Policy makers ignore reality on 
which they intervene and have wrong representations of the conducts to change 
and the dynamics to mobilize for that purpose. More accurate use of scientific 
knowledge dealing with the specific policy domain – for instance criminology - 
may provide tools for better effectiveness.  
A second one derives from dysfunctions in efficiency. Inner management may 
be poor, formal structures may not be adequate. Implementation is a key point. 
Governmental authorities rely massively on organizations to implement them. 
Evidence consistently shows that this transfer is not easy to achieve in a smooth 
manner. It remains a source of risk and waste. Policy studies even suggest that 
up to two thirds of the failures originate because of what happens during the 
implementation  or  administration  phase.  Implementation,  being  achieved  by 
organizations, is prone to routine and to biases. The formal organization as a 
source of error geometrically increases the number and intensity of errors. For 
instance discretionary behaviors of street level enforcers, when not repressed by 
their supervisors, may lead to failing policies. A law exists but it is not fully 
enforced.  It  is  a  consequence  of  a  policy  error  as  much  as  just  a  matter  of 
administrative  mismanagement.  The  specific  organization  governmental 
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Do  public  organizations  correct  their  errors?  To  manage  simultaneously  two 
production  functions  makes  public  organizations  a  complicated  context  to 
handle. Inner dysfunctions may generate outer dysfunctions. 
Rules and formal structures are solutions aimed at solving problems defined in 
advance, the different units inside the agency being expected to conform.  At the 
same time the organization is supposed to produce and handle information about 
its environment and the impacts of its knowledge structure. Information means 
surprise, anomaly, a signal that something goes wrong about action taking and 
the knowledge structure itself.  Evidence suggests that publicness hinders the 
use of errors as incentives to correct knowledge structure. 
Like many private and not for profit organizations, public agencies usually show 
a high level of knowledge. The problem derives from the fact that the more an 
organization has knowledge the less it has information, the less it generates and 
handles errors as a lack of adequate knowledge and a piece of information. An 
error becomes a sin to avoid, a pathological state to hide, not an opportunity to 
learn, a signal to make sense of for future action taking. When error happens 
people are often punished while errors are not spontaneously corrected.  
Unlike  other  classes  of  organizations,  and  because  of  their  effectiveness 
production function, public agencies face another obstacle in correcting errors 
and using information. As mentioned above, and in a majority of cases, external 
impacts indicators are fuzzy and ideologically loaded, objectives are uncertain, 
time horizons are controversial and unstable, causal linkages between a specific 
policy and a specific set of outcomes are not linear and difficult to establish. 
Even rudimentary self-awareness is lacking. 
Policy evaluation is neither spontaneously induced nor obvious to achieve. The 
idea  to  manage  an  evaluation  of  effectiveness  is  an  ideal  goal  difficult  to 
achieve, an utopia (Thoenig 2000). Evaluation and organization are somewhat 
contradictory.  Public  agencies  as  organizations  do  not,  most  of  the  time, 
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surprises that are generated either by the action theory that its organizational 
structure implies or by the societal theory implicit in the policy it is mandated to 
implement. They rely instead on their knowledge to identify societal needs to 
serve  and  effective  means  to  deliver  them.  Efficiency  and  effectiveness  are 
relevant as long as their criteria and achievements are in line with the knowledge 
structure. If not they make not much sense. The public organization prefers to 
discard them as action drivers. Policies are basically self-perpetuating. 
 
From organization to organizing and organized 
Theoretical  and  conceptual  frameworks  are  not  by  themselves  ends.  They 
provide  means.  They  are  useful  as  tools  to  explain  certain  problems,  and 
obstacles to understand others. Publicness as defined above offers a heuristics to 
explore public action and the way public organizations contribute to it.  
Studies of public organizations gain a lot from maintaining close contact with 
policy  analysis.  They  improve  Verstehen  approaches  of  what  governmental 
authorities do and the public issues that are addressed. Bringing policymaking 
and polities back in enables academic research to deal with content, and not to 
focus  only  on  process.  It  also  widens  the  picture.  Daily  routines,  formal 
structures  and  inner  functioning  of  agencies  are  also  parts  of  a  more  global 
action arena called policy-making.  
One major contribution  to publicness study an action perspective supplies is 
empirical.  
In most policy domains problems are addressed and handled by more than one 
formal agency. In other terms what happens in one sector is the consequence of 
what many policies and public bureaucracies do, whether intentionally or not. 
Unemployment is the consequence of multiple governmental acts and non-acts, 
from locating low income housing to fiscal incentives and training programs.  
Several policy sectors and agencies combine to influence its rate and structure. 
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the specific problem it is designed for, but also for other problems and the way 
other policies operate and impact society. Therefore cases are quite exceptional 
when  a  specific  formal  organization  exerts  a  full  monopoly  and  exclusive 
ownership on a policy jurisdiction. 
Observation  suggests  on  and  on  that  public  agencies  are  not  working  in  a 
autarkic manner. Their acts and non-acts are not the only ones that matter to 
solve a specific issue carried by the governmental agenda. Many organizations 
with another legal status – voluntary organizations, private firms, charities, etc – 
intervene, formally or informally, as subcontractors, as policy implementers, as 
problem solvers, etc. Political science defines such sets by metaphors and terms 
such  as  policy  arenas  or  communities.  Local  economic  development,  social 
welfare, health, crime and law, public transportation, are just a few policy areas 
among many that see coalitions at work. The lesson is that public issues and 
their  treatment  should  not  be  considered  in  a  stato-centric  manner.  Public 
policies are collective problems, involving many institutions and organizations. 
Public agencies and the state are just one among many actors, sometimes much 
more powerful and relevant than others, sometimes much less. 
These observations imply lasting consequences for organizations studies. A state 
of the art survey of literature  (Thoenig 1997) classifies public organizations 
according  to  the  degree  to  which  their  inner  functioning  is  impermeable  or 
sensitive to outer dynamics and factors. Four types are listed:  
•  an inward-orientated type. The organizational functioning cuts itself from 
its environment. 
•  an  environment  sensitive  type.  Functioning  takes  into  account  outside 
stakes, groups and  issues by showing local flexibility capacities or by 
institutionalizing cooptation processes, whether formally or informally. 
•  an  outward-driven  type.  Because  the  organization  is  highly  dependant 
from outside forces such as professions or resources such as information,  
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•  an  inter-organizational  set  embedded  type  of  functioning.  The  formal 
organization  does  not  provide  the  backbone  of  its  integration.  It  is 
regulated by some broader and rather stable network or collective action 
system of which it is part.  
Formal organizations are not the only way to fulfill certain outcomes. Other 
social configurations and processes such as organizing and organized do offer 
alternative solutions. Making different logics of action compatible in a lasting 
way  and  without  major  difficulties  can  be  achieved  otherwise  than  by  a 
hierarchy of authority principle. Policy adjustments and cooperation between 
separate when not rhetorically antagonistic public agencies and private operators 
may  even  be  easier  to  induce  without  using  formal  coordination  structures 
across them. Mixing policy analysis and organization analysis leads to identify 
and analyze other forms of social voluntary cooperation: informal cooptation, 
cross-regulation,  redundancy,  collective  action,  networks,  etc.  Public 
organization scholars were to some extent ahead of private firms.  It is later in 
the 1980s that the latter gave birth to attention given to similar mechanisms 
linking operators acting on economic markets such as joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, etc.  
Such a research program started in the late 1970s. Two key social processes 
were brought to light by social sciences:  organizing, the organized.  
Organizing  refers  to  the  way  separate  actors  linked  by  some  form  of 
interdependencies  build  a  pattern  allowing  recurrent  behavior  and  action 
certainty. Which normative schemes and behavioral processes are set up and 
diffused? How and why are action taking and division of work quasi-negotiated? 
(Dupuy and Thoenig 1979). 
Organized refers to the way social configurations grow and evolve that are not 
coordinated by one center, but by a multi-centric core.  How do shared social 
norms – rules on rules, or secondary rules (Reynaud 1989) – emerge and get 
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– or primary rules - emerge? What integrative mechanisms are at work such as 
indoctrination, domination, regulation or self-interest based opportunism? How 
is social integration achieved when no clear-cut limits define the boundaries, the 
limits  memberships,  when  relationships  between  the  various  parts  are  not 
transitive  and  when  asymmetry  between  levels  is  very  low?  What  are  the 
performance abilities of such and such types of organized set up? 
These issues had been ignored by organization studies for many years. Basically 
focused on organizations as formal forms of human activity cooperation, they 
took for granted that to explain social phenomena inside a public agency, it was 
sufficient to observe what was happening inside its legal or formal limits, in 
some cases by adding the users as a source of observation. A few pioneering 
studies had suggested that ignoring the wider action set may be a constraint for 
the advancement of knowledge in organization studies. They identified social 
constructs such as grass roots cooptation of local elites and institutionalization 
(Selznick  1949)  or  exchange  of  favors  between  field  agencies  and  local 
politicians (Crozier and Thoenig 1976). Support and conflict with civil society 
lobbies and social milieus were analyzed as organizational vectors for public 
sector agencies. Policemen, social workers, tax collectors, just to mention a few, 
have a public service mission enforce detailed rules and codified procedures. 
Their success or their failure depends nevertheless to a degree that may not be 
irrelevant  from  access  to  and  support  from  local  resources  provided  by 
outsiders:  to get intelligence, to identify users, to get help from relays and allies, 
etc. Despite such exciting findings public organization studies surprisingly did 
not really switch to other research designs until policies and quasi organized 
action systems would open up a different approach.   
A corollary of such a breakthrough is methodological. If it is true that formally 
autonomous  organizations  may  depend  from  others  when  handling  a  certain 
problem  or  implementing  a  certain  policy,  then  it  implies  that  it  is  such  a 
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organizing activity between a set of actors, that generates this set and provides 
interdependence for cooperation. In other words the content and the context of a 
problem or a policy design inter-organizational types of social configurations.  
Usually rather implicit, they nevertheless may be quite well established, durable, 
etc. One public agency therefore may be part of many such inter-organizational 
settings.  Action  and  order  requirements  are  quite  complex  to  address  in  a 
organized manner, at least more than classic organization sociology inspired by 
Max Weber’s formal model had thought of. Bureaucratization tells only one part 
of the story in public sector and public action.  
Further research is still  needed to explore in a more systematic way a wide 
variety of questions. Three may be worth mentioning: 
•  Are specific kinds of organizational configurations coupled with specific 
policy tools such as monies, rules or institution building?  
Various typologies are available that classify policies according to criteria 
such as the degree of coercion they exert on the groups and individuals 
whose practices and statuses they want to modify (Salisbury 1968) or the 
toolkit  governmental authorities select for policy-making (Hood 1983). 
More systematic and comparative studies would be welcome that would 
verify whether such a co-variation do occur. Pioneering research projects 
undertaken,  for  instance,  by  Renate  Mayntz  and  her  associates  on 
implementation processes in Germany have paved the way (Marin and 
Mayntz 1991). 
•  What are the consequences of dissociation between power and authority? 
Is  it  true  that  horizontal  negotiation  dynamics  facilitate  efficiency  and      
effectiveness  much  more  than  hierarchical  authority?  Do  control  and 
command  processes  really  face  dramatic  difficulties  to  impose  their 
schemes to peripheries that are far from being passive, as it seems to be 
the case for instance for issues and sectors like territorial decentralization 
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are  the  implications  for  organizational  values  such  as  the  pursuit  of 
general interest and for the content of professional skills inside public 
agencies?  Are  administrative  bureaucratization  and  narrow  action 
codification  mere  pathological  obstacles  or  are  they  necessary 
counterparts to make participative democracy work?  
•  Do organizational cognitions matter? 
Classic  organization  sociologists  have  ignored  them.  Policy  evaluation 
research has given more attention to it. Stakeholders express normative 
judgments and mobilize prejudices when considering that a policy fails or 
succeeds. State agencies protect themselves from centrifugal forces and 
particularistic requests emanating from civil society and polity by building 
barriers such as professional norms and moral identity references such as 
the general interest. The nature of such phenomena is clearly cognitive. 
These criteria should be observed in act, and not just as a collection of 
discourses  or  a  set  of  so-called  cognitive  maps.  Shared  cognitions  or 
common  languages  for  action  are  neither  argumentation  nor  rhetorical 
artifacts. They also cannot be confined to local expressions of exogenous 
and global phenomena such as class ideologies or professional cultures. 
They  induce  empirical  consequences.  And  they  are  generated  by 
organized  settings.  Some  progress  has  been  made  about  cognitions  in 
firms (Michaud and Thoenig 2003). Public organization studies have still 
some way to go in this respect. 
The relevance of publicness should be tested, for its own sake as well as an 
analytic tool. Its added value is worth considering as long as it contributes to the 
advancement of general organization, organizing and organized theory, but also 
to  the  understanding  of  public  administration  and  policies  in  multi-level 
societies. 
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